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CLYDE SUMMERS AND THE IDEAL
OF THE ACTIVIST SCHOLAR
ALAN HYDEI-
Clyde Summers' retirement from the University of Pennsylvania
Law School is just the sort of formal change of status, unaccompa-
nied by real effects, that Clyde would normally dismiss as unworthy
of analysis.' Clyde still teaches, writes prolifically, and addresses the
major labor law problems of the day.
However, Clyde's impact on the law has been sufficiently
extraordinary as to be worth celebrating on whatever flimsy excuse.
These remarks aim to summarize Clyde's enduring contributions to
American life and law; to survey the constant values and methods
that have guided Clyde's scholarship over the years; and to see to
what extent Clyde's impact may derive from his values and methods.
I. CLYDE SUMMERS' CONTRIBUTIONS TO AMERICAN LAW
Clyde Summers has had his greatest impact 'on five areas of
American law. The first was as a litigant advancing the freedom of
religious exercise as against governmental orthodoxy. Three others
came through his highly influential scholarship advocating demo-
cratic rights for union members; protection of employees against
unjust discharge; and collective bargaining for public employees.
Finally, Clyde's one article on contract law may justly claim
parenthood over what has become known as "relational" contract
law.
A. Religious Liberty; Admission to Practice Law
Clyde's earliest significant contribution to American law came
neither as scholar nor counsel but as litigant. Clyde was a conscien-
tious objector, on religious grounds, during World War II. Solely
for that reason, he was denied admission to practice law in Illinois.
t Professor of Law, Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey, Newark.
I See, e.g., Summers, The Right to Join a Union, 47 COLUM. L. REv. 33, 33 (1947)
(adequate discussion must include "more than a mere analysis of court decisions, for
the legal problems involved can not be divorced from their social and economic
context").
(627)
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He pursued his claim to the United States Supreme Court, which by
a 5-4 vote upheld the exclusion.
2
While the lawsuit did not succeed in getting Clyde or other con-
scientious objectors admitted to practice law, it contributed to the
growth of American law in at least three significant ways. First, Jus-
tice Black wrote a dissenting opinion, stressing the importance of the
right to practice one's profession and the constitutional necessity
that this privilege be denied only "for what they do or fail to do and
not for what they think and believe."'3 Justice Black returned to
these themes in later opinions in which he wrote on behalf of majori-
ties or pluralities, ordering states to admit those excluded from the
practice of law.4 Second, Clyde's case made jurisdictional law, by
permitting Supreme Court review of constitutional defects, even in
state court decisions styled "informal" and "non-judicial." 5
Third, and to my mind most importantly, Justice Black's dissent
preserved for posterity the idealistic voice of the young Clyde Sum-
mers.6 Some may feel we do Clyde no service by recalling these
youthful enthusiasms. To be sure, Clyde has written more tem-
pered, legalistic statements. He has even stirred up a few lawsuits in
his time.7 Yet what a wonderful treasure is this early statement of his
2 See In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561 (1945).
3 Id. at 578 (Black, J., dissenting).
4 See, e.g., Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957); Konigsberg
v. State Bar of California, 353 U.S. 252 (1957); Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, 401
U.S. 1 (1971) (plurality opinion); Application of Stolar, 401 U.S. 23 (1971) (plurality
opinion). While In re Summers has never been overruled, it is quite difficult to
reconcile with the aforementioned cases, particularly Schware.
5 Clyde's application was denied by a letter over the signature of the Chief
Justice of Illinois and sent to the Secretary of the Committee on Characters and
Fitness. See In re Summers, 325 U.S. at 564 n.4. While the substantive holdings of In
re Summers may be bad, see supra note 4, the jurisdictional holding in quite well-
established and frequently cited. See, e.g., C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS
739 & n.22 (4th Ed. 1983).
6 Justice" Black noted of Clyde Summers that:
Because he thinks that "Lawsuits do not bring love and brotherliness, they
just create antagonisms," he would, as a lawyer, exert himself to adjust
controversies out of court, but would vigorously press his client's cause in
court if efforts to adjust failed. Explaining to his examiners some of the
reasons why he wanted to be a lawyer, he told them: "I think there is a lot
of work to be done in the law .... I think the law has a place to see to it
that every man has a chance to eat and a chance to live equally. I think the
law has a place where people can go and get justice done for themselves
without paying too much, for the bulk of people that are too poor."
In re Summers, 325 U.S. at 574 (Black, J., dissenting).
7 The net effect of Clyde's efforts on behalf of union democracy leading to the
enactment of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin)
Act (LMRDA), Pub. L. No. 86-257, § 2, 73 Stat. 519 (1959) (codified as amended at
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ideals, for who can deny that its fierce heat lends light and warmth to
the later works of his career?
B. Union Democracy Law
It is possible that the United States Congress might have
enacted union democracy law without Clyde Summers, but it is cer-
tain that, had it done so, the results would hardly resemble the law
we have.8 The corruption and abuse of power revealed in the
McClellan hearings might have called for reporting and disclosure,
as the eventual statute is named; or government audits and occa-
sional receivership; or legislated responsiveness on the model of
state corporation statutes; or detailed administrative regulation.
Instead, the statute called for union democracy: freedom of speech
and assembly for union members; equal rights to participate in union
governance; due process in union discipline; mandatory election of
union officers; limitation on national inroads into local autonomy.
This model of institutional reform was intellectually "available"
in 1959 because Clyde Summers had spent over ten years creating it.
He had traced its outlines through masses of fumbling common law
cases in state court.' When the state court cases did not yield up
their grounds of decision, he dug into the unreported records, court
files, and full interviews with lawyers, in the masterly syntheses of
New York law which continue to be as methodologically distinctive
as they are definitive of the subject matter.' 0 He developed legisla-
29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1982)), see infra notes 8-12; and on behalf of employees
discharged without cause, see infra note 13, has undoubtedly been an overall increase
in litigation.
8 See Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, Pub. L. No. 86-257, § 2,
73 Stat. 519 (1959) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 401-531 (1982)). The title is
a misnomer; the legislation goes well beyond reporting and disclosure. It is
sometimes called the Landrum-Griffin Act, after two legislators who freighted the
legislation with amendments expanding union unfair labor practice liability under
the earlier Taft-Hartley Act, and thereby brought with them enough Republican and
conservative Democratic votes to make enactment possible. Clyde Summers has
often stressed the unlikely confluence of factions which made possible the "political
miracle" of the LMRDA. See Summers, Some Historical Reflections on Landrum-Grzffin, 4
HoFsTwA LAB. LJ. 217 (1987); Summers, American Legislation for Union Democracy, 25
MOD. L. REV. 273 (1962).
9 See SummersJudicial Settlement of Internal Union Disputes, 7 BUFFALO L. REV. 405
(1958); Summers, Political Liberties of Labor Union Members, 33 TEx. L. REV. 603 (1955);
Summers, Disciplinary Procedures of Unions, 4 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 15 (1950);
Summers, Disciplinary Powers of Unions, 3 INDUS. & LAB. REt.. REV. 483 (1950);
Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Discipline, 64 HARV. L. REV. 1049 (1951).
10 See Summers,Judicial Regulation of Union Elections, 70 YALE LJ. 1221 (1961);
1990]
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tive proposals and advocated legislative reform." He has continued
to probe the theoretical basis of what was decided in 1959.12 Union
Democracy continues to be the field in which Summers' contribu-
tions remain best-known.
C. Unjust Discharge
Clyde was not the first to call for generalized American protec-
tion against the unjust discharge of nonunion employees, but his
1976 article on the subject seems to have had more influence than its
predecessors in sparking the astonishing efflorescence of common
law restrictions on discharge during the 1980's. 3
D. Public Employees
Clyde's articles advocating collective bargaining rights for public
employees also were successful in their impact. Perhaps today's
younger scholars have forgotten how controversial was the extension
of such collective bargaining in the 1960's. Clyde's articles
examined the issue with his customary shrewd eye for how institu-
tions function in the real world. He advocated public employee
unionism as a way of protecting interests otherwise unrepresented in
the political process. This "political perspective" may have helped
the spread of public employee unionism.
1 4
E. Contract Law
Clyde's sole article about contract law draws on his experience
with the law of collective agreements to make a series of breathtaking
assertions about the general law of contracts. 15 First, there may in
Summers, The Law of Union Discipline: What the Courts Do in Fact, 70 YALE L.J. 175
(1960).
1I See AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, DEMOCRACY IN LABOR UNIONS (1952)
(authored by Clyde Summers); Summers, The Public Interest in Union Democracy, 53 Nw.
U.L..REv. 610 (1958); Summers, Legislating Union Democracy, 10 PROC. IRRA (1957).
12 See Summers, Democracy in a One-Party State: Perspective from Landrum-Giffin, 43
MD. L. REV. 93 (1984).
13 See Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time for a Statute, 62
VA. L. REV. 481 (1976); see also Summers, The Rights of Individual Workers: the Contract of
Employment and the Rights of Individual Employees, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 1082 (1984).
14 'See Summers, Bargaining in the Government's Business: Principles and Politics, 18 U.
ToL. L. REV. 265 (1987); Summers, Public Sector Bargaining: Problems of Governmental
Decisionmaking, 44 U. CIN. L. REV. 669 (1975); Summers, Public Employee Bargaining: A
Political Perspective, 83 YALE L.J 1156 (1974).
15 See Summers, Collective Agreements and the Law of Contracts, 78 YALE LJ. 525
(1969).
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fact be no such general law apart from the law of specific identified
transaction types (such as "long term requirements contracts, dealer-
ships and franchises, restrictive covenants in deeds and long term
leases of business properties, condominiums and cooperative hous-
ing arrangements, or even the common transaction of student regis-
tration in a university"l1), together with "the law of leftovers, of
miscellaneous transactions, the rag-tag and bob-tail which do not get
treated elsewhere." 17 Second, the principles unifying the area, and
particularly the enumerated relationships, must be broad, rather
abstract, inchoate principles resting heavily on concepts like "good
faith" and the protection of the relationship
1 8
Contracts scholars will immediately recognize this as the pro-
gram for the synthesis of the law of "relational" contracts, a project
particularly identified with Ian Macneil, although in recent years
involving contracts scholars as diverse as Charles Goetz, Robert
Scott, and Roberto Unger. Macneil in particular has always acknowl-
edged the influence of this article of Clyde's in his own project.19
Nevertheless, it seems to me as a contracts teacher that few contracts
scholars have found their way to this pathbreaking article which is
commonly misattributed or ignored.
F. Legal Process Issues in Labor Law
Clyde Summers has also written in a number of areas where his
work, though less obviously influential than in the areas already men-
tioned, is methodologically original and may yet come to have more
impact on law and legal scholarship. Two worth particular mention
are the series of scholarship on labor law issues which adopt either a
legal process or comparative law perspective.
Clyde has often illuminated vexed issues in labor law through
careful focus on the peculiarities of the precise institutions
involved. 20 In his hands, legal process has never been the trite reci-
16 Id. at 564.
17 Id. at 565.
18 See id. at 568-74.
19 See Macneil, Reflections on Relational Contract, 141 ZEITHSCHRIFT FUR DIE
GESAMTE STAATSWISSENSCHAFr / JOURNAL OF INSTITUTIONAL AND THEORETICAL
ECONOMICS 541, 541 n.1 (1985); Macneil, Restatement (Second) of Contracts and
Presentations, 60 VA. L. REV. 589, 609 n.60 (1974).
20 This focus pervades his casebook, see C. SUMMERS & H. WELLINGTON, LABOR
LAW (1968), with its case-studies of the process of making labor law and its frequent
criticism of cases because of their ignoring sound principles of interaction between
courts, legislatures, administrative agencies, and arbitrators. It shapes his recent
elegiac, see Summers, Labor Law as the Century Turns: A Changing of the Guard, 67 NEB.
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tation of formulas concerning the essential attributes of institutions.
Rather, his analysis of institutions is always experiential and often
shrewd.
Two of my leading nominations for most-unjustly-neglected-
Clyde-Summers-article fall into this category. His 1954 speech (!) on
the National Labor Relations Board has lost nothing in the interven-
ing thirty-five years. There is very little 1954 scholarship of which
this can be said, and probably none which takes the form of criticism
of a particular agency. Clyde's observation and analysis of adminis-
trative deficiencies remains penetrating.
2 1
A second neglected article in the legal process genre deals with
judicial not administrative lawmaking. It took some boldness to use
the special issue of the Yale Law Journal celebrating Felix Frank-
furter's seventy-fifth birthday as an occasion to celebrate judicial
activism. Yet Clyde's remarks illuminate more recent debates on the
legitimacy of judicial activism.2 2 The article's trenchant analysis of
the particular features of labor legislation and its model of the politi-
L. REV. 7 (1988), on the secular decline of collective bargaining and increased
reliance on courts and legislatures to protect weaker parties in employment
relationships.
21 See Summers, Politics, Policy Making, and the NLRB, 6 SYRACUSE L. REV. 93
(1954). The article first puts NLRB decision making in the context of deep, insoluble
conflict between unions and management on basic philosophic principles. Today
this may appear the most banal of observations, but at the time it was made, and to
some extent even today, it was fashionable to describe this view as obsolescent and to
assert by contrast the fundamental common interest of unions and management.
Clyde denies that the Board can, as it often claims, "administer the statute as
written and as intended by Congress." "In many of the most critical areas neither the
words not the intent are clear. The Board must spell out whole bodies of law from
meager terms or no terms at all." Id. at 95. Moreover, the Board cannot be
"impartial." "Its decisions inevitably strengthen either unions or management in
their underlying dispute." Id. at 96-97. Since Board members deny, even to
themselves, their own legislative authority, they too easily ignore underlying
statutory policies that are comparatively clear and substitute their own policies,
denying they are doing so.
One suggested reform is the greater use of rule-making by the NLRB. This
suggestion became commonplace in academic literature over the next couple of
decades. Clyde's 1954 speech is the earliest reference I have found advocating rule-
making, yet for some reason it is rarely cited.
22 "To measure ajudge's role according to that which can be safely entrusted to
puny men is to reduce the whole Court to a pageant acted by bit players. Neither the
Constitution, our traditions, nor our existing structure treats the Court so casually.
Judicial humility does not demand asceticism but suggests that judges meet the
responsibilities which the system of their day requires." Summers, Frankfurter, Labor
Law and the Judge's Function, 67 YALE L.J. 266, 303 (1957).
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cally realistic interpretation of labor statutes have lost nothing in two
decades.
23
Clyde's models of activist administrators and judges have not
unambiguously carried the day. In fact, his legal process writings
have not had the influence of his writings on union democracy or
unjust discharge. It is true that labor law cases often contain discus-
sions of comparative institutional competence, but these tend to be
result-oriented. When the lawmaking institution is approved, its
processes are denigrated, often by the sameJustices.24 Clyde's care-
ful analyses, of institutional strengths and weaknesses, surface only
occasionally in judicial or administrative decisions or others' aca-
demic writing.
G. Comparative Labor Law
Clyde's career has encompassed a brief period when American
scholars shook off their usual provincialism to seek to learn from
Western European systems of Labor law. Clyde, among others, con-
tributed to this movement with a brilliant cautionary methodological
essay25 and a long series of careful comparative studies.
26
23 See id. at 286-90.
24 On judicial deference to arbitration, compare Alexander v. Gardner-Denver
Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974) (arbitration inappropriate to decide claims of race
discrimination and arbitral rulings entitled only to such deference as courts think
appropriate; defects of arbitration catalogued: arbitrator not permitted to apply
norms external to collective agreement; record incomplete; rules of evidence do not
apply; reasons for award need not be given; union retains exclusive control over
individual's grievance) with Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community
Organization, 420 U.S. 50 (1975) (African-American employees seeking to bargain
outside their union over job discrimination issues are not protected by the NLRA
against discharge; only protests through the union's grievance and arbitration system
would be protected; no catalog of defects in arbitration process found); and Gateway
Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368 (1974) (miners' strike, protesting
reinstatement of foreman convicted of falsifying safety reports, may be enjoined
pending arbitration; no catalog of defects in arbitration process found).
On judicial review of National Labor Relations Board, compare Pattern Makers'
League v. NLRB, 473, U.S. 95 (1985) (approving Board policies despite expressed
doubts about their wisdom and concurrence with statute; heavy emphases on Board's
discretion in administering statute) and Beth Israel Hospital v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483
(1978) (same) with First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981)
(reversing longstanding Board policy without any reference to acceptable range of
Board policymaking under Act).
25 See Summers, American and European Labor Law: The Use and Usefulness of Foreign
Experience, 16 BUFFALO L. REV. 210 (1966).
26 See Summers, An American Perspective of the German Model of Worker Participation,
8 CoMP. LAB. L. 333 (1987); Summers, Comparisons in Labor Law: Sweden and the United
States, 7 INDUs. REL. LJ. 1 (1985); Summers, Worker Participation in the United States:
Some Comparisons from an American Perspective, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 175 (1984); Summers,
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It is not easy to point to the direct influence of these studies on
American law or scholarship, which has not tended to follow Euro-
pean models. Nor is it easy to say why interest has waned, even
among scholars, in comparative labor law. Other advanced capitalist
economies offer many interesting models to American scholars.
Perhaps a future generation of scholars and policy makers may
one again turn to the comparative study of labor law. When they do,
Clyde's careful and cautionary studies will continue to be a model for
future scholarship.
II. SOURCES OF CLYDE SUMMERS' INFLUENCE
In short, we celebrate an extraordinary career, one to which any
young scholar might aspire, irrespective of political values: an
extraordinary influence on federal and state legislation, common law
changes, and the scholarship in one's fields and related fields. Are
there specific features of Clyde Summers' scholarship, apart form the
innate attractiveness of the substantive proposals, which help explain
its extraordinary emphasis?
Values clearly stated. Clyde is never elusive or Aesopian about his
underlying ethical and political values. His commitment to liber-
alism, to free inquiry, to the protection of weaker individuals, is often
explicitly stated.27 Such professions of liberal values may have gone
out of fashion in legal scholarship among self-described progres-
sives. The current fashion seems to call rather for the nihilistic
denial of values or an insistence that the law permits free choice
among a range of values, with nothing but taste governing the
choice. Perhaps these are descriptively correct statements about the
nature of legal argument. Still, open profession of values doesn't
seem to have done Clyde Summers' influence any harm.
Concrete proposals advocated. Clyde's articles typically move
beyond general values to quite specific models of law reform. This is
particularly true in his two areas of greatest influence. Both his
1950's articles on union democracy, and his 1976 article on unjust
Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time for a Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 481
(1976); Summers, Freedom of Association and Compulsory Unionism in Sweden and the United
States, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 647 (1964); Summers, Collective Power and Individual Rights in
the Collective Agreement: A Comparison of Swedish and American Law, 72 YALE L.J. 421
(1963).
27 See, e.g., Summers, The Sources and Limits of Religions Freedom, 41 ILL. L. REV. 53,
68-69 (1946). This, one of Clyde's earliest articles, contains a manifesto of liberalism
from which Clyde had not deviated since.
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discharge, make very specific proposals, specific both as to substan-
tive values and as to institutional responsibility.
Political realism. Clyde early committed himself to a mode of
scholarship calling for politically realistic proposals, although argua-
bly no alternative mode existed as a model in the 1940's.28 In
today's intellectual climate, this self-limitation is often equated with
pulling punches, accommodation, or cowardice. Yet Clyde's career
shows how proposals in fact quite radical when made can neverthe-
less be put forward as politically realistic, and eventually triumph.
Wide range of ideas. As we have seen, Clyde's concrete proposals
often draw on his comparative knowledge of other systems of labor
law. His proposals on unjust discharge and on public employees
particularly show this influence. Today's legal academy is by con-
trast often influenced by systems of thought, such as law-and-eco-
nomics, which deny the significance of cultural differences and do
not overtly draw on comparative law, assuming that it will only
instantiate economic forces postulated as uniform across cultures.
Stick to principles; don't be reactive. Early in his career, Clyde articu-
lated his political principles and his terrains of combat. Thereafter,
he continued to advance his principles in a broad collection of pro-
posals. The scholarship is never reactive. It is not distracted from its
chief end by a beguiling Supreme Court case, an amusing adminis-
trative problem, someone else's felicitous article. The project rolls
on, incorporating useful matter from cases and statutes as it finds
them.
It must be said that Clyde incorporates very little of other peo-
ple's scholarship. To his credit, there are none of the petty scholarly
interchanges we now accept as normal, no critiques of or responses
to other people's articles. On the other hand, perhaps, there were
occasions when feelings were hurt by Clyde's failure to acknowledge
other scholars' efforts. All in all, it would be difficult to find a simi-
larly-sized body of legal scholarship less reactive to the work of
others. The overwhelming cumulative effect of his work stems in
part from this refusal to be drawn into scholarly debate.
CONCLUSION
Open articulation of progressive political values; concrete pro-
posals; political realism; wide incorporation of ideas from other legal
28 See, e.g., Summers, supra note 1, at 33 ("It is ultimately a political problem of
finding a solution that is sufficiently acceptable to the parties concerned to have a fair
chance of adoption.").
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cultures; comparative lack of concern for debates internal to the
academy. This is far from the model of legal scholarship prevalent
among younger academics these days. Still and all, younger scholars
who aspire to Clyde Summers' influence might consider adopting his
method.
